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Journal of European Social Policy
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From family wage to marriage subsidy and child benefits: controversy and consensus in the development of family support

Ingalill Montanari

Swedish Institute for Social Research, Sweden

The long-voiced claim of a family wage became a reality in the form of generalized family support after the end of the Second World War. This support has two components: child benefits and support for a dependent spouse, and the marriage subsidy. From a gender-theoretical perspective the marriage subsidy is one of the political means to influence the balance of paid versus unpaid work. The development of the marriage subsidy in 18 OECD countries is here followed from 1950 to 1990 and is compared to the development of child benefits. Since the 1970s there has been a growing divergence among our countries with respect to the marriage subsidy. Reinforcement or gradual decrease of this policy is here taken to indicate a general political support for the single breadwinner family model or its opposite, the dual-earner family model. Empirical analyses indicate that partisan politics have been of relevance to the development of the different forms of family support. Since marriage subsidies predominantly take the form of tax allowances which are always regressive in character, the class dimension is here intermingled with the gender dimension, which may account for some of the unexpected results.

Key Words: child benefits • dependent spouse subsidy • family support • family wage • paid-unpaid work • single-dual-earner family model

Journal of European Social Policy, Vol. 10, No. 4, 307-333 (2000)


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